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Abstract: The article discusses basic questions of narrative studies and definitions
of narrative from a historical and conceptual perspective in order to map the ter-
rain between different narratologies. The focus is placed on the question of how
fiction interacts with other realms of our lives or, more specifically, how reading
fiction both involves and affects our everyday meaning making operations. Brit-
ish horror writer Ramsey Campbell’s (b. 1946) short story “The Scar” (1967) will be
used as a test case to show how both narrative modes of representation and the
reader’s narrative sense making operations may travel between art and the every-
day, from fiction to life and back. We argue that the cognitively inspired narrative
studies need to pair up with linguistically oriented narratology to gain the neces-
sary semiotic sensitivity to the forms and modes of narrative sense making. Nar-
ratology, in turn, needs to explore in detail what it is in the narrative form that
enables it to function as a tool for reaching out and making sense of the unfami-
liar. In our view, reading fictional narratives such as “The Scar” can help in learn-
ing and adopting linguistic resources and story patterns from fiction to our every-
day sense making efforts.
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1 Sameness and difference in narrative studies
Narrative studies is a diverse field in many respects: in definitions of what narra-
tive is, in disciplinary traditions, as well as in research methodologies and re-
search orientations. Even in the heyday of structuralist narratology, narrative was
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understood in at least two different ways: the story and its organization (see Rim-
mon-Kenan 2006). Narrative studies nowadays is a thriving ground for different
subcategories like socionarratology, cognitive narratology, discourse narratol-
ogy, narrative hermeneutics, feminist narratology or narrative medicine, just to
name a few. Therefore, the question of “sameness” and “difference” in narratol-
ogy should be narrowed down to be able to give any answer to it. In this paper, we
will first go through some basic questions of narrative studies and definitions of
narrative from a historical and conceptual perspective in order to map the terrain
between different narratologies. We then concentrate on the question of how fic-
tion interacts with other realms of our lives or, more specifically, how reading
fiction both involves and affects our everyday meaning making operations. Brit-
ish horror writer Ramsey Campbell’s (b. 1946) short story “The Scar” (1967) will be
used as a test case to show how both narrative modes of representation and the
reader’s narrative sense making operations may travel between art and the every-
day, from fiction to life and back.
The recent decades have witnessed in narrative studies a leaning towards the
emphasis on a storyworld, as well as a readerly orientation towards storyworlds.
In contrast to classical theories of narrative that systematically emphasized tem-
porality and causal sequence, cognitive-theoretically informed narratology has
been well on its way to elaborating the processes of immersion (Ryan 2001), read-
erly orientation within the storyworld (Herman 2002, 2009), and perceptual posi-
tioning on the levels of storyworld, narration and the actual reading process (Jahn
1996). Here we can find a kind of sameness approach, since these approaches
have systematized the reading process by analogy to real-life experience. Readers
navigate within storyworlds, become immersed in them, and they try to frame and
apperceive whatever textual strangeness befalls them. The seminal study suggest-
ing this “natural” connection between literary narratives and real-life experiential
schemata is Monika Fludernik’s Towards a “natural” narratology (1996). For Flu-
dernik, the prototypical case of narrative is the orally transmitted story, and tex-
tual and artistic design is regarded only as a variable of conversational para-
meters. She argues that these natural parameters constitute the basis for the read-
er’s effort to narrativize texts, to make sense of them.
With the central term narrativization Fludernik refers, as a source of inspira-
tion, to Jonathan Culler’s notion of naturalization. Culler’s view on the reason and
function of naturalization, however, does differ from Fludernik’s take on narrati-
vization. Culler’s (1975: 134) starting point is the fundamental paradox of litera-
ture. Its divergence from ordinary communication makes it compelling, and yet
this divergence needs to be naturalized for the reader to understand the meaning
and value of literature. Therefore, a basic difference can be found between Cul-
ler’s “naturalization” and Fludernik’s “narrativization.” Whereas Culler coined
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his term to explain the reader’s activity in coming to terms with the strangeness of
fiction, Fludernik understands the reader to apply the same cognitive processes
and schemata whether interpreting narrative literature or coping in everyday
communicative situations. For this reason, her argument is that no special natur-
alization is needed in the case of fiction, as the same processes of narrativization
operate in understanding any narrative, be it an oral story or a novel.
Yet it would be an oversimplification of Fludernik’s theory to understand it
only in terms of what she argues to bring fiction and other narrative realms close
to each other. What seems to be important for both Culler’s and Fludernik’s mod-
els of narrative sense making is the role of a genre and other artistic conventions.
Culler (1975: 137) states: “what we speak of as conventions of a genre or an écri-
ture are essentially possibilities of meaning, ways of naturalizing the text and
giving it a place in the world which our culture defines”. Fludernik (2003: 244)
sees the narrativization process to operate on four levels of transmission. They
include basic-level schemata (real world understanding), perspectival schemata
(ACTION, TELLING, EXPERIENCING, VIEWING, REFLECTING), generic and histor-
ical frames (such as satire and dramatic monologue) and, finally, the level of nar-
rativization that unites the other levels into a coherent whole.
Fludernik’s theory has been understood primarily in the terms of the real life
schemas and the perspectival frames, whereas the generic and historical – the
artistic tradition and conventions – has been mostly neglected. These aspects
should gain more attention, because genre and discursive resources employed in
different genres allow a more complex understanding of the traffic between con-
versational and literary storytelling, or between our understanding of the world
we live in and the worlds represented in fiction. This brings us back to the division
between story and its organization, the ways narratives occur as semiotic repre-
sentations.
Recent developments in fictionality studies have demonstrated how narrative
modes characteristic of generic fiction do occur also in non-fictional narrative en-
vironments. What needs further elaboration is how these narrative modes, espe-
cially those related to consciousness representation and enabling the portrayal of
the mind of the other, affect the interpretive operations and outcomes in non-fic-
tional narrative realms (see Hatavara & Mildorf 2017 a, 2017b). In this paper, we
look at the same question from the other end – how narrative modes and narrative
sense making operations in fiction may affect our everyday experience and under-
standing of the world.
Literary imagination contributes to how people envision, represent, and ulti-
mately perceive their lives and the lives of others. David Herman (2011: 10) main-
tains that “the procedures used to engage with the minds evoked in fictional nar-
ratives necessarily piggyback on those used to interpret minds encountered in
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other contexts (and vice versa)”. We emphasize the much overlooked “vice ver-
sa”, and claim that literature and literary devices are crucial to finding, testing
and distributing ways of expressing cultural and social subject matter. For exam-
ple, the study of fictional minds has shown both the distinctive ability of fiction to
portray the mind of another person, and the kinship of minds working both inside
and outside of fiction in sense making operations (Cohn 1978; Palmer 2004). This
allows the reader to situate herself in the storyworld and adopt the temporal and
spatial situation in the fictional reality (Herman 2002: 14–15). The qualities of
narrative and the procedures used to interpret them do travel between fictional
and non-fictional realms, but the interpretive effects need a closer study.
Fiction has the unique ability to create and represent human minds both in-
ternally and externally, even to verbalize emotions and mental states the subject
is unaware of having. Narrators use internal focalization of other people thus por-
traying the world as someone else perceives it, and narrators also use psychonar-
ration to inform the reader of a character’s feelings and inner motivations they
themselves are (yet) unaware of. Narrative discourse modes like free indirect dis-
course mix the voices of the narrator and the character bringing about dual-voic-
edness and interpretive uncertainty on whose perception or opinion the reader
encounters. In fiction, the world presented and the minds perceiving it cannot be
separated, and it is the reader’s task to make sense of what may be real or ima-
gined in a storyworld. The culturally shared and the idiosyncratically understood
may blend in ways by which the minds and the worlds become inseparable (see
Hatavara & Toikkanen 2017).
What is more, by blending scripts, imagining non-existing scenarios and re-
viving traditions literature constantly influences the ways in which people experi-
ence and imagine social life and tell their own stories. Therefore, narratology has
the tools to identify and analyze how experiences and feelings manifest and be-
come shareable in our mediatized environment. Narratological tools that analyze
discursive agency and positioning are needed, as societal discussion and social
interaction is based on constructing hypothetical narratives about other persons’
reasons and intentions (Hutto 2008). In literary studies representing and attribut-
ing minds in fiction has been a core question since the study of the novel began
(see Lubbock 1921; Cohn 1978). Today it is recognized that changing and evolving
models of fictional minds correlate with the growing cultural complexity of the
human mind in general (Herman 2011). The intermental workings of the mind are
developed in fictional practices where they come to the fore, and the ways we
understand reality and fiction cross into each other (see Palmer 2004, 2010; Hutto
2008). Therefore, narrative fiction may inform us on the workings of interpretive
minds both inside and out of fictional narrative environments. Before turning to
the case study, we offer a suggestion of three different types of conceptualizing
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narratives that have cut across the fields of literary theory and narrative studies in
the social sciences.
2 Narrative as cognitive tool, rhetorical act and
semiotic articulation
In the social sciences, it was Jerome Bruner (1991) who famously placed stories as
explanatory vehicles in situations where Folk Psychology, the canon of the ex-
pected, fails to grasp the world. Therefore, for Bruner, narrative as a form not only
represents but constitutes lived reality: “It was perhaps a decade ago that psy-
chologists became alive to the possibility of narrative as a form not only of repre-
senting but of constituting reality” (Bruner 1991). Faced with the unexpected and
the unfamiliar, people resort to narratives to help bring back coherence into their
experience. This insight has had great impact in the study of the pragmatics of the
storytelling situation. Literary scholars have contended that arguably, narrative is
“a basic human strategy for coming to terms with time, process, and change”
(Herman et al. 2005). According to this cognitively inspired understanding of nar-
rative, crafting stories help people organize their experience and the world they
live in. As our case study will show, new theories in fields such as evolutionary
psychology (see Clasen 2017) have developed this line of thought even further by
arguing how stories can help in evolving into more advanced “biocultural” life
forms.
The second trend in conceptualizing narrative is a rhetorical one, which un-
derscores the situatedness of storytelling as an act. It is easy to find parallel ex-
amples of this definition from the social sciences and from literary theory. Back in
1981 Barbara Herrnstein Smith wrote: “we might conceive of narrative discourse
most minimally and most generally as verbal acts consisting of someone telling
someone else that something happened” (Smith 1981: 228). Some twenty years
later James Phelan (2005) defines narrative as “somebody telling somebody else
on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something happened.” Therefore,
both the rhetorical and the cognitive approach to narrative studies manifest many
convergences between different disciplinary traditions in literary and social stu-
dies. In these two approaches, the emphasis lies on narrative processing as a cog-
nitive ability, or in the interactive situation between storytelling participants, but
not on narratives per se, as articulations and semiotic objects.
Semiotic, or textual definitions of narrative come mostly from the literary nar-
ratology tradition, inspired by the structuralist tradition (see Ryan 2016: 11). Gér-
ard Genette (1980) defines, in also mentioning a story pattern, a “linguistic pro-
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duction” to be essential to narrative: “any narrative . . . is a linguistic production
undertaking to tell of one or several events”. In a similar manner, Gerald Prince
(1982) defines narrative as a representation – for him, a narrative is “the represen-
tation of at least two real or fictive events or situations in a time sequence”. More
recently, Marie-Laure Ryan (2005) has defined narrative as “the mental or textual
representation of a causally linked sequence of events involving individuated and
human-like agents”. Interestingly, according to this definition, a representation
may exist as a mental entity as well as textual. Still, these definitions concentrate
on narratives as representations mainly.
The three categories of definitions emphasize different parts of the narrative
interaction: the cognitive focuses on how the receiver understands narratives, the
rhetorical is mostly interested in the sender, her intentions, and the story’s de-
signed effects, whereas the semiotic focuses on the sign, on the representation of
story elements in text or another medium. This paper understands all these facets
of narrative to be important but orders them so that the sign, the semiotic object,
sets the analysis in motion as it moves on to looking at the rhetorical effects,
together with the cognitive operations involved.
Besides the similarities between the reader’s interpretation of bodily gestures
(such as shaky hands as an indication of nervousness) within and without fiction,
it is indisputable that while in real life we can directly observe the other person’s
bodily gestures, in literary fiction we can only imagine them through linguistic
description. As one of the authors of this article has argued elsewhere, this textual
organization necessarily separates readings of literary fiction from readings of,
say, everyday encounters with others (Hatavara 2013: 164–167). The specific orga-
nization of a narrative, the form and style of a representation need to be taken into
account (Ryan 2016: 25). In this article, we are especially interested in the inter-
play between the semiotic organization of a text and the cognitive processes used
to interpret the story. Both are essential in the interpretation of narratives.
When looking at the different definitions of narrative, it is important to ask
howwe find and identify narratives based on them. Brian McHale (2016) has made
a telling observation as he writes that “theory-building depends partly on deter-
mining what counts as a prototypical object of a particular theoretical discourse”.
As McHale states, most often the prototypical object has been either a novel or
everyday oral storytelling. In order to overcome this dichotomy, it is useful to look
at how different definitions of narrative help to locate narratives. It has proven
challenging to pinpoint “a basic human strategy”, but a recent definition of nar-
rative helps to demonstrate the (at least) two sides of narrative. Richard Walsh
(2018) claims that “[n]arrative is the semiotic articulation of linear temporal se-
quence; a basic cognitive mode of sensemaking that creates meaningful form with
a specific temporal logic”. The two parts in Walsh’s definition must be noted be-
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cause the sentence talks about two different types of narrative: the former part
about a concrete object in the form of some conventional signs, the latter about
an abstract ability of mind. For Walsh, “sequence” is the main concept in this
definition, whereas our approach emphasizes and analyzes the “semiotic articu-
lations”, as they can be identified in communicative situations. We also expect
them to be linked with more abstract cognitive processes. For this reason, the
cognitively inspired narrative studies need to pair up with linguistically oriented
narratology to gain the necessary semiotic sensitivity to the forms and modes of
narrative sense making. Narratology, in turn, needs to explore in detail what it is
in the narrative form that enables it to function as a tool for reaching out and
making sense of the unfamiliar.
3 “The Scar”
Ramsey Campbell’s short story “The Scar” (1967) shows how fiction claws into the
everyday. In the town of Brichester,1 Lindsay Rice leads a lowly and uneventful
life marked by weekly visits to his sister Harriet and brother-in-law Jack Rossiter
who have two children, Douglas and Elaine. Lindsay feels inferior to the Rossiters
in social standing, is worried about bothering them, and hopes he was able to
please them – “I wish I could do something for them so they’d be grateful to me”
(Campbell 1967: 61). Meanwhile, Jack, who runs a jewellery store, has come to
point where he keeps seeing Lindsay “out of a sense of duty” (Campbell 1967:
62) but remains in good terms with him because of Harriet who is concerned for
her brother and how he gets along in life. The story suggests from the start that the
plot may involve a relationship triangle where the two men, husband and brother,
rival around Harriet, or one where the two siblings rival around Jack. Harriet ex-
plains Jack her brother’s situation: “You know I always had the best of everything
and Lindsay never did – Now I’ve got you. Surely we can spare him kindness at
least.” (Campbell 1967: 60) The motif of doubles – siblings, two men in a woman’s
life – is of key significance in the story. It is introduced on the first page where
doppelgängers are mentioned as a (German) cultural phenomenon and something
Lindsay had in fact witnessed: a man very closely resembling his brother-in-law.
Importantly, Lindsay keeps thinking about and mentioning a book he has read
about a man who rescues his friend from falling off a cliff but ends up killed him-
self. This story thematizes the need to do something for others, and it repeatedly
1 Campbell created the fictional location of Severn Valley, which includes the town of Brichester,
as his geographical expansion of Howard Phillips Lovecraft’s Cthulhumythos in England.
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appears in Lindsay’s imagination as an image of two figures falling off a cliff high-
lighting the motif of pairs of two.
The plot revolves around a crime spree that is taking place in Brichester.
Shops have been raided, and Jack is cautious about any danger to his own estab-
lishment, not helped by Lindsay’s being curious about the matter. In walking one
evening to have a few drinks with Lindsay, Jack cuts through an alley where he is
attacked by a figure with a face that was “merely a black egg in the shadows”
(Campbell 1967: 63). Afterwards, Jack begins to turn into a different man. In Lind-
say’s eyes, he soon becomes a threat to his wife and children, prompting Lindsay
to take the opportunity finally to do something for the family he admires. Ulti-
mately, however, it all ends badly.
We argue that, in terms of the sameness and difference of narrative fiction
and everyday narrative strategies, reading “The Scar” collapses the confident dis-
tinction between the two. While fiction and non-fiction rely on different generic
traditions andmay indeed make use of different narrative techniques and conven-
tions, it does not follow that they were completely separate from another in how
they employ linguistic resources and produce experience. Neither does it follow
that, consequently, there was nothing special or peculiar about narrative fiction
such as “The Scar” in comparison to summary explanations of the story, for in-
stance. A careful reading will bring out key observations that any paraphrasing of
the plot could easily neglect. In our analysis, we will focus on two passages:
“I read a book this week,” (Campbell 1967: 64)
The grey fields were abruptly blocked by a more solid anonymity, the streets of Lower Bri-
chester, suffocating individuality, erasing it through generations. (Campbell 1967: 70)
On the argued collapse of the distinction between narrative fiction and everyday
narrative strategies in our case study, the discussion inspired by Samuel Taylor
Coleridge’s famous Romantic notion of the “willing suspension of disbelief” (Bio-
graphia Literaria 1817: Chapter XIV) will provide a useful source. Among others,
Kendall Walton (1978) and Noël Carroll (1990) have analyzed the issue called the
paradox of fiction – why readers are strongly affected by entities and events they
know to be fictional (see Paskow 2004). In terms of the evolutionary benefits of
reading fiction, and horror fiction in particular, Mathias Clasen’s views (2017) will
also be introduced in this context.
What is more, it is precisely the artistic arrangement and the narrative modes
of consciousness representation that make the short story so compelling and af-
fective to the reader. “The Scar” thematizes the inability of people to read each
other’s minds, as the characters feel totally estranged from one another and un-
able to read anyone else. They also often misread each other’s minds (see Hyvär-
inen 2016), which is coupled by the reader’s failing efforts to make sense of the
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story. With the inconclusive ending, the reader is left teetering between (at least)
two interpretive alternatives because she is unable to determine whether the
minds of the two men whose perceptions and thoughts through manifold modes
of mind representation guide the reader at key points are reliable or not – or if one
of them is. In this way, the short story thematizes the question whether fictional
minds differ from real minds in nature or degree of transparency or accessibility
(see Herman 2011). At the same time, we argue that “The Scar” does more than
merely follow an established genre pattern, and that the consequences of grasp-
ing the sense making practices of one’s reading of the story must not be explained
away by a confident distinction between fiction and real life.
3.1 “I read a book this week”
Lindsay’s need to do something for his close ones increases in the course of the
story, and he is inspired in his eventual rescue attempt by a story he has just read.
He tells Jack about it:
Harriet withdrew to the kitchen. “I read a book this week,” Rice caught at the conversation,
“about a man – what’s his name, no, I forget – whose friend is in danger from someone, he
finds out – and he finally pulls this someone off a cliff and gets killed himself.” (Campbell
1967: 64)
In Lindsay’smind, themoral of the story becomesmixedwith his feeling of indebt-
edness to theRossiters, and so, as the events unfold, references to Lindsay’s fiction-
informed conscience and an image of two figures falling keep appearing in the nar-
rative. For instance, he first becomes alert to the strange goings-on in Brichester
whenhe sees Jack’s lookalike in the bus onemorningwith only one feature separat-
ing Jack and his apparent double – a lengthy scar across the latter’s face. Lindsay
makes Jack aware of the incident, but withholds the information from Harriet and
indeed some of the details (where the double went after leaving the bus) from Jack
too. Afterwards, he agonizes over what he should have told whom.
The effect of reading stories on Lindsay’s thinking is intensified when, as a
result of the attack in the alley, Jack is left with a scar similar to his double. As
Lindsay attempts to make sense of the unnerving events, reality and fiction start
to shift in his perception:
Something was going to happen; he sensed it looming. If he could only warn them, prevent
it – but prevent what? He saw the figures falling from the cliff-top against the azure sky, the
seagulls screaming around him – but the mist hung about him miserably, stifling his inten-
tions. He began to hurry to the bus-stop. (Campbell 1967: 65)
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The falling figures are those of characters in the story Lindsay has read, appearing
into view out of thin air in the quotidian grey of Brichester, recharging him with
the responsibility to help both his brother-in-law and sister without overt care for
personal harm.
The story eventually culminates in Lindsay making his stand against Jack’s
double and the horrors hinted at (“He plunged into the fog, knowing that now he
would be followed”, Campbell 1967: 70) The men reach the alley where Jack’s
attack took place andmake their way to the building Lindsay had seen his friend’s
lookalike enter before. Inside, Lindsay scours through the derelict rooms and
finds what seems like a man’s body in the cellar. Confronted by Jack’s double in
the stairs, Lindsay summons his every last bit of strength (“focusing his horror,
fear and disgust with his lifetime of inaction”) and tears through the entity with a
brick. Stumbling his way out of the house, however, he comes across another
figure just as he is about to make good: “No, he thought in despair, he couldn’t
fail now; the fall from the cliff had ended the menace. But already he knew.”
(Campbell 1967: 72) The figure in the doorway is “his height, his build” (Campbell
1967: 72), speaks with his voice, and is ready for the kill and to replace Lindsay as
his double. Therefore, the novel very concretely suggests the possibility that
someone we think we know, including ourselves, may turn into someone comple-
tely alien.
Clasen has celebrated inWhy Horror Seduces (2017) the positive gains of read-
ing horror fiction from the viewpoint of evolutionary psychology:
Horror fiction... is particularly well-equipped to allow readers and viewers to vicariously live
through the worst, to model threatening scenarios, and to get imaginatively compelling ex-
perience with extreme situations and intense negative emotion. (56)
As the reader’s “appetite for horror” is “an adaptation that functions to give us
experience” that will “allow us to incorporate danger into our total imaginative
universe” (Campbell 1967: 58), she reads in the safety of her knowledge of the
distinction between fiction and reality, adding to her cognitive arsenal in continu-
ously evolving as she proceeds. Indeed Lindsay perceives himself in this light as
his passive everyday routine takes a turn towards the heroic – he has not been
reading novels such as The Lord of the Rings for no purpose. The extreme situation
in his immediate environment gives him the chance to incorporate his experience
and actually put his horror to good use, with bad results. The question lingers if
the reader is able to adapt the outcome as any kind of cognitive improvement
either.
It is very clear in “The Scar” how the protagonist’s sense of reality is invaded
and finally ended by something he has read in a book. The fictional character of
Lindsay Rice exemplifies the kind of psychological ambiguity – a conventional
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strategy of narrative fiction–bywhich it is hard to tellwhether the events described
are happening for real in the story, whether they just take place in his head, or if the
events are real but affected by his distorted perception. Considering Rice alone, the
reader may choose willingly to suspend their disbelief, imagine that the town of
Brichester is being taken over by alien doppelgangers, and pretend to be shocked
or frightened by the revelation. InWalton’s theory, such a choice could bemade at
the reader’s leisure, just as he demonstrateswith his example of “Charles”pretend-
ing to be afraid of themovie he is watching (“He thinks of himself as being afraid of
it”, Walton 1978: 16; “He plays his own game with the images”, Walton 1978: 18).
Meanwhile, Carroll would describe the reader’s “cause for interest” in the horrify-
ing as an offshoot of her “fascination with the impossible” that “outweighs the dis-
tress it engenders” (Carroll 1990: 206). However, as both Walton and Carroll seem
mainly interested in the affective and epistemological consequences of the poten-
tial existence of ontological objects – are they real or not, and how should we feel
about them? – the narrative strategies by which the objects first appear into view
are set aside.When thequestionofwhether thedoubles in “TheScar” are real or not
becomes the primary focus, the reader may quite easily choose to believe that Rice
has just lost hismind, tracking down the signs of hismadness. As a consequence of
this decision, the ontological realms of fiction (Rice) and real life (reader) remain
confidently removed from each other, because there is nothing to suggest other-
wise. It is only when we look at the other minds represented in the story that clues
to the contrary begin to show.
3.2 “The grey fields were abruptly blocked by a more solid
anonymity”
Lindsay is not the only character in “The Scar” whose mind we can read. In the
first half of the story, Jack’s internal focalization is used at least as much as Lind-
say’s, and there is evidence of Harriet’s thoughts too (see the paragraph on “Her
eyes gathered details”, Campbell 1967: 67). Initially the reader’s access into Jack’s
mind portrays him as a decent man and husband, even if one rankled by the on-
going crime spree and Lindsay’s repeated efforts at goodwill. The passage in
which Jack is on his way walking to his brother-in-law’s house is a complex mix-
ture of his own ruminations and narratorial intrusion:
Yes, he liked to walk through Lower Brichester. He’d made the walk, with variations, for
almost two years; ever since his night out drinking with Rice had settled into a habit. It had
been his suggestion, primarily to please Harriet, for he knew she liked to think he and Lind-
say were friends; (Campbell 1967: 62)
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Headlights blazed down a side street, billowing with mist and motorcycle fumes. They spot-
lighted a broken wall across the street from Rossiter; a group of girls huddled on the shat-
tered bricks, laughing forth fog as the motorcycle gang fondled them roughly with words.
(Campbell 1967: 62)
The first quotation demonstrates several embedded minds as the reference to
Lindsay Rice switches from his last name to his first. The first two sentences are
internally focalized through Jack who tries to enjoy his walk to the house of his
brother-in-law, referred to as Rice. In the third sentence Jack’s use of language
changes as his internal focalization adopts the position of his wife from whose
perspective her brother is referred to by his first name. The last sentence of the
first quotation portrays what Jack (thinks he) knows: Harriet likes to believe Jack
and Lindsay are friends. The change into Harriet’s language use highlights the
superficial nature of Jack’s assumed knowledge of her mind. The use of Harriet’s
verbalization brings about a similar two-voicedness in Jack’s thoughts as free in-
direct discourse brings between a narrator and a character – is Jack’s knowledge
of his wife’s beliefs that accurate, after all?
Whereas both Jack and the narrator are in the habit of calling Lindsay by his
last name, the switch in the latter quotation to calling Jack by his last name must
be attributed to the narrator. The story often gives the impression that whenever
the narrative’s focus shifts from individual perception (Lindsay, Jack, Harriet) to a
narratorial voice that describes Brichester’s general culture of squalor and decay,
individuals become hopeless, disposable game for a looming threat.
Nowhere is this hopelessness more pronounced than in the moment when,
ironically, Lindsay chooses to make his stand against Jack’s double. The situation
at the Rossiter house has escalated beyond repair and, while not everyone might
be dead, Lindsay is not going to wait any longer. The chain of events noted above
ensues, and the passage after his plunge “into the fog” (Campbell 1967: 70) be-
gins:
The grey fields were abruptly blocked by a more solid anonymity, the streets of Lower Bri-
chester, suffocating individuality, erasing it through generations. (Campbell 1967: 70)
It is impossible to tell whether the sentence expresses Lindsay’s thought or if it
represents another narratorial intrusion. What the reader knows for sure at this
point is that access to Jack’s thoughts has been lost, and his mind is completely
unreadable in the second half of the story. An everyday fact – people have no
access to each other’s thoughts – has taken over the strategy of fiction known as
mind reading, producing fear and unease. The “more solid anonymity” of the
preceding quotation invades Brichester’s cultural atmosphere haunted by Cold
War and nameless Lovecraftian terrors (“Was this the key? Had someone been
driven underground by blitz conditions, or had something been released by
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bombing?”, Campbell 1967: 70), while it threatens to destroy the individual
speaking voices that fall beneath its weight. Lindsay, finally in making his stand,
manages to hold on to his experience – the rest of the paragraph reverts to his
focalization – but, in the end, the resistance proves futile.
The short story plays with the reader’s efforts to read the characters’mind and
to make sense of the story elements and the plot by giving the reader access to the
minds of the characters at moments when their perceptions and insights into the
other minds seem skewed and unreliable. This is particularly true about Lindsay.
The theme of him encountering something that is difficult for him to make sense
of is introduced right at the first sentence of the short story: “‘It was most odd on
the bus today,’ Lindsay Rice said”. (Campbell 1967: 59, emphasis in the original)
Lindsay has seen what he suspects to be Jack’s double. Later in the short story the
reader is provided access to Lindsay’s mind at the moments of his possibly mis-
taken revelations about his brother-in-law being replaced by another person or
potentially an inhuman entity. Lindsay is possibly misled by both his passions
and by his habit of interpreting the events through the books he has read.
After the attack, once Jack has recuperated enough to go back home, Lindsay
visits the couple bringing books with him to lend to Jack. This part of the short
story uses Lindsay’s internal focalization, revealing from the start his keen obser-
vations of his sister and Jack: “it was clear she had been crying”, “Jack appeared
in the hall, one hand possessively gripping the living-room door-frame”. (Camp-
bell 1967: 65) The observations are key motifs in Lindsay’s perception as he goes
on to take action: his sister is sad and oppressed, his brother-in-law an obsessive
tyrant. A little later in the text Jack is irritated by the siblings whispering about his
condition in the next room:
“What’s all that whispering?” a voice shouted. “Aren’t I one of the family anymore?”
“Jack, don’t be illogical. Surely Lindsay and I can talk.” But she motioned Lindsay into the
living-room.
“Treating me like a stranger in my own house!”
Lindsay dropped the book. Suddenly he realized what he’d seen: Jack’s face was paler, thin-
ner than last week; the scar looked older than seemed possible. He bent for the book. No,
what he was thinking was absurd; Harriet would have noticed. Jack was simply worried. It
must be worry. (Campbell 1967: 65–66)
In this passage, Jack in the next room out of sight is perceived only as “a voice”
first. This attribution as “a voice” and not as “Jack” gives the first clue of his new
strangeness, and Jack himself offers this explanation in lamenting his treatment
“like a stranger”. Lindsay, hearing the word stranger, first drops his book, then
retrieves it, and after leaving the Rossiters throws the book away as he tries to
make sense of the situation. He is described as “suddenly realizing” that it is in-
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deed so that Jack is a stranger and wonders if his sister would not have noticed the
same. When Harriet later visits Lindsay, he tries to persuade her to understand
this. As Harriet talks about her duties towards her husband, the reader is offered
access to Lindsay’s mind:
She can’t believe that! Lindsay cried. He tottered on the edge of revelation, and fought with
his tongue. “Don’t you think he’s acting as if he was a different person?” He could not be
more explicit. (Campbell 1967: 68)
Here the reader is first given a direct quotation of Lindsay’s thoughts followed by
the narrator giving information on the affective tone of this internal cry of des-
peration. The second sentence is psychonarration by which the narrator more clo-
sely relates Lindsay’s thoughts and mental processes. The last sentence is in the
form of free indirect discourse where the reader can deduce Lindsay’s thought of
being as explicit as possible. Still, even if Lindsay thinks he knows Jack has chan-
ged and does his best to make Harriet understand, he fails. This failure to com-
municate – perhaps coupled with a failure correctly to understand another mind –
becomes the key reason for Lindsay finally taking action in his fiction-informed
duty to rescue his sister and the children.
4 Conclusion: Fiction claws into the everyday
The futility of the reassurance of being able to read other people’s minds is the
most horrifying conclusion of “The Scar” on two levels. First, it breeds distrust
and paranoia in those exposed to it, whether in fiction or real life. Two, it col-
lapses any confident distinction between narrative fiction and everyday narrative
strategies. Mind reading is a strategy of fiction we employ each day when we try to
make sense – in reading and writing, watching and listening – of why people act
the way they do and what they might think. When deprived of this alternative and
forced to face reality, enacting the fiction of “The Scar”, our everyday narrative
strategies of making sense are exposed as being not that dissimilar from our ways
of reading fiction. The unreadability of minds horrifies in the story and, because
the unreadability of minds is an everyday fact, the reader is horrified too.
To counter the effect, the reader may assume the Coleridgean strategy known
as suspension of disbelief, knowingly distancing themselves from the story as
everyday readers in order to pretend that, in Walton’s fashion, they believe in the
story as fiction. Thinking on the terrible can be fascinating, as Carroll might say.
Indeed, as long as other minds remain readable, there is nothing to worry about,
and if they become blocked, as in real life, readers have the choice of reasserting
the strategy of fiction by recalling that it is “only” fiction, something different
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from the everyday. For there to be an evolutionary benefit to reading fiction, as
advocated by Clasen, the reader must choose to remain partly in the realm of fic-
tion (of readable minds and confident distinction) to keep believing in its improv-
ing qualities. In doing so, the reader will transport how they make sense of the
everyday into how they read fiction – as a generic narrative mode with its techni-
ques and conventions that employ linguistic resources and produce experience.
Fiction claws into the everyday and contaminates it, and vice versa.
There is no paradox of fiction in “The Scar” but a fact of life. The conclusion
brings us back to the question of sameness and difference between artistic and
everyday narrative objects and the sense making operations involved in encoun-
tering them. Fictional narratives thematize our everyday efforts to read other
minds and to understand social situations. We can learn and adopt linguistic re-
sources and story patterns from fiction to our everyday sense making efforts. Lit-
erature, literally as part of our everyday lives in the form of linguistic descriptions,
can be used to inform us on the narrative resources employable in different sense
making endeavors.
The travelling of narrative modes and interpretive resources from fictional to
non-fictional realms collapses neither the narrative objects nor the narrative
sense making operations into any indistinct sameness where one definition of
narrative or one narrative methodology is fit to be used in the analysis and inter-
pretation of all narratives. Instead, any narrative inquiry should be fully informed
by both the manifold nature of narratives and the richness of theoretical and
methodological approaches in narrative studies. Narratives infuse our lives as
medium-specific types of semiotic objects from novels to jokes, from advertise-
ments to social media updates and beyond. Even though narrative modes such as
certain linguistic resources used to represent the minds of others travel between
narrative environments, we should always pay attention to the semiotic qualities
and conventions used in any articulation of a story into a narrative in a specific
medium. The text that represents cannot be isolated from the represented, and
therefore interpretation both as attention to signs and as recognition and reshap-
ing of cognitive schemas requires scrutiny.
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